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Abstract
*
After a period of convergence in the early and mid 1990s, the  euro area
economies have started to diverge.  As a consequence, the common monetary
policy is becoming increasingly ill-suited for a number of countries.  This paper
studies the extent and severity of the recent divergences, and discusses the
capacity of exposed countries to compensate for locally inappropriate monetary
conditions through other policy channels.  Two tools are developed for
monitoring intra-euro area developments; a “convergence barometer” monitors
divergences, and a Taylor rule based “monetary thermometer” compares the
common monetary policy to benchmark optimal policy for individual countries.
A main conclusion is that policymakers at the  euro area level should be
concerned about divergences, since automatic stabilisers alone may not be
enough to restore a healthy equilibrium to “outlier” countries.
Keywords: Euro, EMU, divergence, Taylor rule.
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Non-technical Summary
Evidence suggests that after a period of convergence in the early and mid 1990s,
the euro area economies have started diverging.  Two main consequences of this
are, first, that  euro area aggregate statistics are misleading and need to be
supplemented by additional data in order for sensible policymaking to take
place; second, the common monetary policy is becoming increasingly ill-suited
for a number of countries.
It should be kept in mind that Euro-area member countries agreed to the
structures of a common currency in part for economic reasons; these
arrangements are expected to place member countries on superior growth and
development paths as compared with alternative structures.  In the event that this
hope is not satisfactorily realised, and politically unsustainable situations occur
in labour markets or elsewhere, there may eventually be a debate about
disengaging, which in turn would put the entire project into crisis.  While we do
not expect this to take place, we do believe that EMU stands to perform better
long term if policymakers put careful thought into some of the ways in which it
might potentially unravel.
The challenge is therefore to prevent unacceptable economic difficulties
from arising or at least persisting in any part of the euro area.  For this reason,
due regard should be paid to significant regional divergences from the euro area
averages; outliers do matter disproportionately, even when their weights in the
euro area averages are very small.  How big can member country divergences
become before they present a problem?  The answer is: not very big, if labour
markets are rigid and fiscal policy is constrained, thus restricting the adjustment
process of the national economy to monetary and other imbalances.
It should be emphasised that differences are always to be expected within
a common currency area, and need not cause serious discomfort so long as
effective mechanisms exist to compensate for the imbalances.  An even-handed
assessment of the desirability of a common monetary policy must also take due
account of the benefits, which are outside the scope of this paper but have been
clearly established elsewhere.
This paper studies empirically the extent and severity of the recent
divergences, and assesses the capacity of exposed countries to compensate for
nationally suboptimal monetary conditions through other policy channels.  To
improve monitoring of intra-euro area developments, we develop two new tools.
First, a “convergence barometer” monitors imbalances within the euro area in
critical policy dimensions including unemployment, inflation, debt, and fiscal
balances.  This point-in-time analysis establishes the scale and nature of severalRSC 2000/14 © 2000 N. Björksten and M. Syrjänen 4
important differences across euro area countries.  Second, a Taylor rule based
“monetary thermometer” compares the common monetary policy to benchmark
optimal policy for individual countries, thus enabling us to see what the
“optimal” level of interest rates would be if the entire euro area were to look like
Germany, or Italy, or Ireland, etc.
The Taylor rule analysis suggests a very wide dispersion of economic
conditions across the euro area.  At the extremes, Germany's economic situation
would call for lower interest rates along the lines of 1.6 per cent, whereas
Ireland would benefit from significant tightening and interest rates around 7 per
cent.  Several robustness tests on the Taylor rule confirm these results as regards
the extent of dispersion and the rank ordering of the countries according to the
need for monetary tightening/loosening.
The Taylor rule cannot, however, give as complete a picture as we need
for policy-making purposes, because it omits from its benchmark calculations
the role of exchange rates.  To the extent that the euro exchange rate remains at
a sustained low level, the effect is highly expansionary on small open economies
with considerable trade outside of the euro area.  A consideration of the trade
statistics of euro area countries strengthens further concerns that some countries,
such as Ireland, are in danger of overheating.
In order to shed light on the question of euro area enlargement to include
some of the “outs” countries, we calculate Taylor Rule benchmark optimal
interest rates for the UK, Greece and Denmark as well.  All three countries
would benefit from a tighter euro area monetary stance than is currently the
case.  It should be noted, however, that the sheer size of the UK economy will
have a significant effect on the euro area averages upon which monetary policy
decisions are based.  While the UK at present is at a different stage of the
business cycle than Germany, France and Italy, it is by no means an outlier with
respect to the constellation of different economic states prevailing in the euro
area.  Consequently, the accession of the UK to the euro area would have a
stabilising effect on EMU, which would benefit the UK in the same way as it
would benefit many of the smaller and faster growing euro area countries.  This
perspective is worth taking note of in the UK domestic debate on whether or not
to join the euro area.
To assess the capacity of economies to adjust to a common monetary
policy that is locally suboptimal in varying degrees, an assessment is also made
of the relative flexibility of both fiscal policy and of labour markets across the
different euro area economies.  The euro area countries are ranked in terms of
the relative inflexibility of their labour markets; France and Finland are among
the least flexible, Ireland among the most flexible.  This result suggests that asRSC 2000/14 © 2000 N. Björksten and M. Syrjänen 5
compared with France or Finland, a country such as Ireland can afford larger
differences between locally optimal interest rates and the interest rates
determined by the common monetary policy.
A main conclusion of the paper is that policymakers at the euro area level
should be concerned about divergences, since automatic stabilisers alone may
not be enough to restore a healthy equilibrium to potential “outlier” countries.
The framework and tools developed in this paper are readily adaptable to other
cases of common currency areas.RSC 2000/14 © 2000 N. Björksten and M. Syrjänen 6
1. Introduction
Differences in economic developments in euro area countries are making area-
wide statistics difficult to interpret.  In recent months, attention has focused on
the divergence of business cycles between the euro core and periphery, and at
times even within the core.  The implications of these developments are still
unclear.  With rapid and wide-ranging structural adjustments taking place, even
country-specific statistics have become misleading.  At the same time, there is
an alarming knowledge gap regarding developments at disaggregated levels,
given the difficult and ongoing process of harmonisation of statistics in Europe.
Individual governments should be concerned, as the automatic adjustment
mechanisms of labour and product markets are clearly being tested earlier and
more severely than had initially been anticipated.
Should the European Central Bank (ECB) also be concerned?  Monetary
policy can no longer address imbalances that emerge within the euro area. Why,
then, is it important for monetary authorities to monitor internal divergences?
There are two important reasons.  First, the presence of diverging internal trends
can complicate decision-making.  In order to prescribe an appropriate mix of
policy measures, such weighted averages which underlie policy decisions could
usefully be supplemented with more disaggregated statistics.
Second, as several observers have pointed out, the Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) can be brought into crisis if one individual member
state starts a serious internal political debate about leaving
1.  This would
represent a worst-case scenario, in which a country retrospectively considers the
lack of a national monetary instrument prohibitively costly and the current
arrangements politically unsustainable. Euro-area countries agreed to the
structures of a common currency in part for economic reasons; these
arrangements are expected to place member countries on superior growth and
development paths as compared with alternative structures.  In the event that this
hope is not satisfactorily realised, there may be a debate about disengaging.
While we do not expect this to take place, we do believe that EMU stands to
perform better long term if the ECB and others put careful thought into some of
the ways in which it might possibly encounter crises.
                                                             
1 The risks of this are played up in  Buiter (1999) and  Calomiris (1999), fairly neutrally
presented in Calmfors et al (1996), Obstfeld (1998) and  Sims (1998), and played down in
Wyplosz (1999) and  Eichengreen (1998b).  The overall relevance of this question was
recently highlighted by market reactions to public comments of former Italian Prime Minister
Romano Prodi, who was interpreted as suggesting that Italy may exit the euro arrangement if
economic conditions do not develop favourably.RSC 2000/14 © 2000 N. Björksten and M. Syrjänen 7
The challenge is therefore to prevent unacceptable economic difficulties
from arising or at least persisting in any part of the euro area.  For this reason,
due regard should be paid to significant regional divergences from the euro area
averages; outliers do matter disproportionately, even when their weights in the
euro area averages are very small.  How big can member country divergences
become before they present a problem?  The answer is: not very big, if labour
markets are rigid and fiscal policy is constrained, thus restricting the adjustment
process of the national economy to monetary and other imbalances.
Euro-area monetary policy is not able to respond to regional imbalances
without compromising its primary objective of price stability, which is out of the
question for reasons that have been  well-established in numerous debates.
Fiscal adjustment is currently restricted by the stability and growth pact (SGP).
Adherence to the SGP is seen as crucial in order to avoid an inflationary bias in
the euro area – without the SGP, individual governments have an incentive to
have an overly loose fiscal policy since the cost of monetary tightening would
be shared
2.  Structural adjustment, whereby imbalances are resolved over time
by real sector adjustments in labour and product markets, is a slow process.
Indeed, one of the greatest concerns of economic observers has consistently
been that the generally poor functioning of European labour markets will cause
most economies (and especially peripheral ones) considerable suffering at one
time or another under a common monetary policy.  Several studies over the past
decade have documented the scope for policy to improve labour market and
regulatory institutions, with a view to increasing speed and flexibility of
structural adjustment
3.  Nevertheless, progress has been and is expected to
remain slower than is desirable
4.
This paper examines more closely the current status of economic
divergences within the euro area, concluding that they are significant and do not
appear to be diminishing.  The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 presents the evidence so far on diverging trends, and develops a
“divergence barometer” as a tool to monitor imbalances within the euro area.
Section 3 evaluates the appropriateness of monetary policy, using Taylor rule
evidence.  A “monetary thermometer” is developed as a tool to compare
monetary-related strains on member economies.  Section 4 assesses the
flexibility of l abour markets and the constraints imposed by the stability and
growth pact.  Section 5 concludes and proposes directions for further work.
                                                             
2 There are other good reasons for the Pact as well, such as the desire to avoid public defaults
that would spill into contagious debt crises (see Eichengreen and Wyplosz 1998).
3 See e.g. CEPR (1991), OECD (1994), Coe and Snower (1997), Sims (1998) and Cecchetti
(1999).
4 See e.g. IMF (1999), European Commission (1998), OECD (1998, 1999a,b).RSC 2000/14 © 2000 N. Björksten and M. Syrjänen 8
2. Diverging Trends: The Evidence
Does the empirical evidence on economic convergence so far give reason for
optimism?  Between 1992 and 1997, economic policy in most EU states was
geared toward convergence and closer integration, with the benchmark being to
satisfy the  Maastricht requirements for EMU entry.  Subsequent evidence
suggests that after 1997, however, convergence has stopped and may be
reversing
5.  One plausible reason for this is that after qualifying for membership
in EMU, attention of national policymakers has turned from convergence to
other pressing issues, such as unemployment.
Figure 1 plots inflation developments in the Euro area in the two years
since mid-1997.  While the weighted average of harmonised headline inflation
rates has gradually declined, the spread has grown between the maximum and
minimum inflation rates observed in individual member countries.  The same
trend also exists in the variance in inflation rates (not shown), which has grown
considerably during the same period.   
Figure 1. HICP Inflation Rates in the Euro Area
% Annual percentage change, excluding Luxembourg
1997 1998 1999
Figure 2 plots GDP growth statistics, also since mid-1997. The overall decline in
growth masks the extremely strong performances of Ireland, which throughout
the time period has by far grown much faster than all other euro area countries,
and Finland, which has likewise outperformed all others but Ireland.  With or
without these two outliers, it is not clear that any convergence has been taking
                                                             
5 Wyplosz (1999) argues that the Maastricht targets focus too much on convergence towards a
1980s style culture of monetary stability anyway, and are not enough to ensure a successful
currency union in a world of unexpected shocks and high unemployment.RSC 2000/14 © 2000 N. Björksten and M. Syrjänen 9
place across the  euro area in the GDP growth patterns of individual member
countries.








% Minimum and maximum are calculated excluding Ireland, Luxembourg and Finland
Looking ahead, relative growth forecasts in the euro area show some interesting
patterns.  Table 1 compares realised and forecast member country per capita
GDP levels and growth rates across the euro area for the years 1998-2000.
These comparisons are easy to make, since the countries now share a common
currency.  The benchmark point of reference is the Euro-11 as a whole, which
has been defined as 100 for each year.  Thus, numbers that are higher than 100
indicate countries that are wealthier than the euro area average.  Numbers that
grow larger each year indicate forecast growth levels that are faster than the euro
area average.
Table 1.  Index of Euro Area per capita GDP
1998 1999 2000
Euro11 100,0 100,0 100,0
Austria 118,2 118,9 119,6
Belgium 110,6 110,2 109,8
Finland 110,6 111,7 112,6
France 110,1 109,2 108,9
Germany 117,7 116,5 116,4
Ireland 99,5 107,3 115,9
Italy 89,9 89,8 89,7
Luxembourg 183,8 184,0 185,5
Netherlands 108,6 109,2 109,3
Portugal 48,5 50,0 50,9
Spain 63,6 64,6 65,4
Data source: Eurostat, NewCronosRSC 2000/14 © 2000 N. Björksten and M. Syrjänen 10
By and large, the relative gainers are mostly small and on the  euro area
periphery, whereas the relative losers are mostly larger and closer to the core.
Both groups include both richer and poorer countries.  While all this may be
coincidental due to the short time span of observation, a plausible explanation is
that small peripheral countries have benefited the most from increased price
stability and lower perceived susceptibility to shocks, which has thus increased
confidence to consume and invest. If so, this can be regarded as a one-off effect
that illustrates a direct benefit of having become a part of the euro area.
Explaining divergences in growth and inflation is difficult to do reliably.
Some may be cyclical, as economies grow rapidly and approach a danger zone
for overheating.  Some may also be due to an economic development catching-
up process following closer integration.  In the latter case, differences may be of
a longer-term structural nature, and will require a different type of policy
attention.  For policymakers, it is therefore important to separate between the
two effects.
Recent divergences in growth are likely due mostly to desynchronised
business cycles (Italy and Germany slowing down, Ireland, Spain and Portugal
accelerating, and Finland continuing its return to trend growth following an
exceptionally severe recession).  Inflation differences are also likely to have a
substantial cyclical component, besides a structural component associated with
an economic catching-up process of relatively poorer countries.
While it has been debated whether the euro area should or should not
strive to have a common business cycle, this discussion is rather academic.
Business cycle divergences are temporary and by nature self-reversing, so that a
euro area wide monetary policy will not systematically be either too tight or too
loose for any individual country.  Therefore, so long as the cyclical swings can
be contained within acceptable bounds, the problem will eventually disappear.
Only extraordinary swings will probably require policy intervention beyond
what is provided by automatic stabilisers.  The crucial question is: what are the
maximum acceptable bounds that can be tolerated for deviations from the euro
area averages?
Convergence Barometer
When discussing economic divergences within a currency area, merely
monitoring inflation and growth figures is not enough to obtain a comprehensive
understanding of the overall macroeconomic situation and thereby also the
resulting priorities for economic policy locally.  In order to better present the
individual situation of various  euro area countries  vis-à-vis the  euro area
average, we construct a “convergence barometer”.  The barometer is so namedRSC 2000/14 © 2000 N. Björksten and M. Syrjänen 11
because it condenses into one diagram a large amount of information by which
to assess both the current status, and the likely future direction of economic
developments.  The barometer in Figure 3 displays in one diagram the current
relative state of any euro area member economy in six key dimensions: inflation,
unemployment, GDP growth, expansion of domestic credit, fiscal balance, and
debt to GDP.












Loans to private sector,






surplus (+) or deficit (-)
as percentage of GDP,
forecast 1999, EC
General gross debt as
percentage of GDP,
forecast 1999, EC
The arrows show the more desirable direction of deviations from the euro area
average, which is to fall within the hexagon of euro area averages.  In the
graphical presentation, the scales have been reversed for GDP growth and fiscal
balance, in order to simplify the visual intuition.  As regards credit growth, the
appropriateness of above-average or below-average levels needs to be assessed
in conjunction with inflation and other statistics.  As always when dealing with
common currency areas, it should be kept in mind that very large deviations
even in positive directions can be reason for concern.
Data in the barometer (see Figure 4) corresponds to the single most recent
observation that was available at the time of writing.  For inflation, we use the
08/99 observation of  Eurostat’s harmonised index of consumer prices.  For
unemployment, we use the seasonally adjusted monthly  Eurostat defined
harmonised employment figure
6, as reported in both OECD’s Main Economic
                                                             
6 Eurostat has developed a benchmark employment series which merges 6 quarterly labour
force surveys, three annual labour force surveys, three national accounts series, one
registration data series and one microcensus. Eventually, it is hoped that this monster can be
replaced by a well-designed quarterly labour force survey that is run in all member states.RSC 2000/14 © 2000 N. Björksten and M. Syrjänen 12
Indicators and the OECD Hot File, Key Economic Indicators
7.  Debt figures
refer to forecast 1999 general gross debt as a per cent of GDP, as reported by the
European Commission on 19 March 1999 -- figures were originally received
from member states and adjusted for comparability by Eurostat.  Fiscal balances
refer to March 1999 forecasts by the EC of the general government surplus (+)
or deficit (-).  Credit growth refers to the year on year increase in credit to the
private sector, as reported in a compilation from national sources.
With regard to the choice of indicators, inflation, growth, unemployment,
fiscal balance and debt figures all correspond to direct and indirect objectives of
economic policymakers.  Expansion of domestic credit can, in conjunction with
inflation and growth figures, also provide insight into the direction of economic
developments and eventually the sustainability of policy.
The choice of indicators also reflects our current use of the barometer,
which is to present a general overview of divergences in broad areas that are of
central concern to policymakers.  If we wanted to investigate related questions
in more detail, the appropriate dimensions would be different.  For example, if
we consider the question of cyclical vs. trend divergences, our choice of
indicators would reflect dimensions where cyclical and structural components of
unemployment, inflation and GDP growth were more clearly delineated
8.  Fiscal
balance would be retained as a primarily cyclically influenced variable and
debt/GDP as a primarily structural variable.  Likewise, if we were to seek a
more detailed understanding of divergences in inflation, we would use multiple
subcategories of inflation instead of only HICP.
Figure 4 shows the point-in-time maximum and minimum divergences
within the  euro  area which correspond to the latest observations for the
barometer’s variables.  Barometer pictures for each of the eleven member
countries are given in Annex 1.
Several interesting patterns emerge from this exercise.  First, it seems
clear that several countries with high unemployment also have high gross
                                                             
7  The standardised unemployment rates for the EU countries are the  Comparable
unemployment rates produced by the Statistical Office of the European Communities
(Eurostat). The standardised unemployment rates give the numbers of unemployed persons as
a percentage of the civilian labour force. The definition of unemployment conforms with the
definition adopted by the 13th Conference of Labour Statisticians (generally referred as the
ILO guidelines). The same is true for the definition of labour force, with the exception that
Eurostat uses  estimates which are based only on labour force surveys covering private
households.
8 This would be an important subject for study in order to advice on specific policy measures
to address imbalances, since temporary and persistent problems should be matched with
temporary and permanent solutions, respectively.RSC 2000/14 © 2000 N. Björksten and M. Syrjänen 13
debt/GDP ratios and/or weak fiscal balances, effectively limiting room for fiscal
policy measures.  Likewise, high local inflation (and thus lower real interest
rates on  euro markets) correlate with higher growth of credit aggregates,
suggesting at least the potential for the formation of an economic bubble if
lending standards are not kept tight enough.  The correlation matrix of all of the
barometer variables, across all of the euro area countries, is given in Table 2.
Figure 4. Euro Area Convergence Barometer




























Table 2.  Correlation Matrix of Barometer Variables
Infl Unemp Credit GDP Fiscal Debt
Inflation 1
Unemployment 0,10 1
Credit growth 0,65 -0,44 1
GDP growth 0,57 -0,30 0,82 1
Fiscal balance 0,33 -0,21 0,57 0,73 1
Debt/GDP -0,03 0,45 -0,59 -0,64 -0,54 1
In conclusion, there are plenty of divergences within the  euro area. We
developed the barometer as a tool to keep track of several interrelated variables
in a compact form, and to compare them with euro area averages.  Given the
differences that exist, it would be surprising if the same monetary policy suited
all individual member countries equally well.  A closer examination of this issue
is the subject of Section 3.RSC 2000/14 © 2000 N. Björksten and M. Syrjänen 14
3. Assessing the Relative Appropriateness of Monetary Policy
On the face of it, one might expect that a common monetary policy would cause
economic strains in those member countries that  deviate the most from the
averages on which monetary policy is based.  The seriousness of those strains
depend on two things: (i) how big the deviations are and (ii) the flexibility of
other economic adjustment mechanisms besides monetary policy, such as fiscal
policy and labour/product markets.  These strains would be in addition to
already existing imbalances caused by shocks or other factors.
The existence of divergences within the euro area, documented above,
therefore begs the following question: does the common monetary policy of the
ECB lead to or compound difficulties in some parts of the common currency




One way to answer these questions is to look at a benchmark for monetary
policy, which makes possible comparisons between “ideal” policy stances for
the euro area average versus individual member countries.  Below, we have
incorporated one such benchmark into an indicator which we call the “monetary
thermometer”, because it tries to determine whether the economy is too “hot” or
too “cold” for the current euro area monetary policy stance.  An economy that is
too hot risks overheating because monetary policy is too loose for local
conditions, while the reverse is true for an economy that is too cold.
The particular benchmark that we use is based on the work of John B.
Taylor, who has proposed a simple monetary rule that has received a great deal
of attention
10.  While it is widely acknowledged that neither the European
Central Bank nor the United States Federal Reserve could consider giving up
discretionary authority over monetary policy given the ongoing turbulence and
uncertainty of global macroeconomic developments
11, the so-called Taylor rule
                                                             
9 This is a narrower version of the more general question: ”can economic imbalances become
large enough to warrant  euro area wide policymaker attention, regardless of the
appropriateness or inappropriateness of monetary conditions?”
10 See Taylor (1993).  A literature review of the Taylor rule is contained in Peura (1999).
11 Since the Taylor rule is reactive in nature (as opposed to proactive), its effective use is
sensitive to the reliability of data that is available at the time that decisions need to be made.
This currently implies serious data difficulties, especially in Europe, as preliminary statistics
often undergo significant revision after they are first released.  It is still too early to accurately
assess the susceptibility to revision of the new European System of A ccounting (ESA 95)
national accounts data.  A. Orphanides of the United States Federal Reserve has pointed outRSC 2000/14 © 2000 N. Björksten and M. Syrjänen 15
constitutes a widely accepted benchmark for monetary policy.  As such, it has
value as one of several tools for analysis.
A Taylor rule is a very simple formulation by which monetary authorities
adjust the short term interest rate in response to two factors only: inflation
deviations from a target level, and the size of the output gap.  A constant term
indicates what level of the short-term interest rate is consistent with full
employment.
Taylor’s original formulation was:
r = p + 0.5y + 0.5(p-2) + 2
where,
r is the short interest rate controlled by monetary authorities,
p is the rate of inflation over the previous four quarters,
y is the per cent deviation of real GDP from a target.
From the formulation above, it can be seen that Taylor assumed the target level
of inflation to be 2 per cent, and the economy’s equilibrium long run real rate of
interest to also be 2 per cent.  Thus, when inflation is stable at 2 per cent and the
economy is operating at its potential, nominal interest rates should be 4 per cent.
In empirical tests, the Taylor rule has been found to track actual monetary policy
surprisingly well from the late 1980s until the present, both in the United States
and in several large European countries.
While Taylor rules have been calculated for some individual countries in
the  euro area, the history of EMU is too short for a meaningful policy
comparison to be made between benchmark and actual policy
12.  Nonetheless, it
is a straightforward exercise to calculate a benchmark “optimal” monetary
policy for  a  euro area under a variety of different macroeconomic
characteristics.  Euro area monetary policy is a function of the developments in
each of the individual member countries, weighted by country size.  Therefore,
by adjusting the weights of various countries in the  euro area average,
benchmark “optimal” policy can be calculated for each of the individual  euro
area countries.
                                                                                                                                                                                               
that under such circumstances, one might expect the Taylor rule to perform better with ex post
data analysis than with actual policymaking.
12 Gerlach and Schnabel (1999) have nonetheless demonstrated that average interest rates in
the EMU countries have, during the 1990s, generally moved very closely with average output
gaps and inflation as suggested by the Taylor rule.RSC 2000/14 © 2000 N. Björksten and M. Syrjänen 16
We have done this, using the original form of Taylor’s rule with the sole
change being that the target inflation rate was assumed to be 1 per cent
13.  Data
for inflation averages the past 12 months’ observations of Eurostat’s harmonised
index of consumer prices (HICP), the last observation being 8/99.  Estimated
output gaps are from  OECD’s Economic Outlook 66, December 1999.  The
results show the extent to which current euro area policy deviates from what the
benchmark optimal policy would be, were the entire euro area to look like
Germany, or Italy, or Ireland, etc.  This information is useful in illustrating the
relative strain on fiscal and structural policy in different countries as they
compensate for the burden of a common monetary policy that is not fully geared
to local conditions.  Thus, the larger the difference between actual (euro 11) and
benchmark monetary policy in Ireland, for example, the greater the strains will
be on fiscal and structural adjustment mechanisms of the Irish economy to
restore the economy to a long-term sustainable growth path.
Using the OECD figure for the  euro area aggregate output gap, the
thermometer (see Figure 5) suggests that optimal euro area short interest rates
should be 2.4, which was very close to the setting up until the (pre-emptive) 0.5
percentage point increase in November to 3 per cent. The divergences are in
some cases quite large, with Ireland, Portugal and the Netherlands apparently at
greatest risk for overheating and Germany at the greatest risk for enduring a
downturn.  Among non-euro area countries considering joining the EMU, the
prevailing monetary policy would be far too loose for Greece, the UK and
Denmark, although the economic weight of these countries would probably
affect the weighted averages by enough to raise the  euro area interest rate
somewhat.
It should be emphasised that differences are always to be expected within
a common currency area, and need not cause serious discomfort so long as
effective mechanisms exist to compensate for the imbalances.  Any balanced
assessment of the desirability of a common monetary policy must also take due
account of the benefits, which are outside the scope of this paper but have been
clearly established elsewhere.
For comparison, we have calculated a monetary barometer for the year
2000 as well, using forecast values for inflation (from the EC) and output gaps
                                                             
13 The ECB has the stated intermediate objective of keeping inflation “below two per cent”.
While a specific target figure has not been stated, it seemed logical that for the purposes of a
benchmark Taylor rule, we should use a rate lower than 2 per cent.  We chose 1 per cent
because this is the mid-point of the implicit 0-2 target range for inflation, and is a level that
current inflation seems to be converging to (see Figure 1).  Changing the inflation target
causes only a linear shift in the thermometer, so the dispersion remains the same (see Annex
2).RSC 2000/14 © 2000 N. Björksten and M. Syrjänen 17
(from the OECD).  The year 2000 barometer is depicted in Figure 6, for the euro
area countries.
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Figure 6 shows a surprising amount of convergence among most of the current
members of the euro area
14.  If this forecast is realised, however, it still implies
an extreme  outlier status for Ireland, although the situation is somewhat
alleviated by a rise in euro area interest rates to just over 3 per cent.
How useful and robust is this tool for analysis?  The Taylor rule has been
critically reviewed on several counts, which are surveyed below:
•  Are the policy response parameters the right size?  Taylor’s original
formulation weights policy response at 1.5 to inflation and 0.5 to
output gaps.  Simulations by economists using a variety of models
have suggested that these parameters are too low; a more efficient rule
would have higher parameters for both inflation and output gaps
15.  If
this is true, then the divergences within the euro area become even
more worrying (see Annex 2).  Nonetheless, it has also been counter-
argued (Smets, 1998) that when there is serious uncertainty about the
values of the deviations, responses should probably be more muted
16.
This would apply more strongly to the output gap variable, since its
measurement is more controversial than inflation.
•  How reliable are the estimates of potential GDP and the long-run
equilibrium real interest rate?  Three points are worth noting in this
regard.  First, the monetary thermometer constructed in this paper is
concerned with the differences between countries’ benchmark interest
rates, not their actual levels.  Using different estimates of output gaps
tends to shift the thermometer’s scale by a slight amount, but the
differences persist (see Annex 2).  Second, estimates of output gaps
and equilibrium “neutral” interest rates are essential to formulating
monetary policy under any circumstance; if these are incorrectly
estimated to begin with, monetary policy is unlikely to be further
misled by looking at a Taylor rule benchmark.  Finally, the efficiency
of the Taylor rule is reduced when the variables are poorly estimated,
but the rule itself remains inherently stable; under a Taylor rule,
                                                             
14 This forecast convergence in inflation rates and output gaps may need to be taken with a
grain of salt.  In the immediate aftermath of the introduction of the euro, one might expect (i)
greater forecasting uncertainty associated with structural changes in the euro area economies,
and (ii) considerable political pressure on international organisations to, when in doubt,
emphasise convergence/downplay any tendencies for divergence.
15 A good review of these tests is contained in Taylor (1998), who acknowledges uncertainty
about the appropriate size of coefficients and proposes that the benchmark rule be
supplemented with a portfolio of other rules, including Taylor rules with higher and lower
coefficients.
16 One implication is that in the limit, if there is no confidence at all in the measured size of
the output gap, the policy response to measured output gap changes should be zero.RSC 2000/14 © 2000 N. Björksten and M. Syrjänen 19
monetary policy cannot spiral out of control even under the most
extreme conditions.
•  How robust is the Taylor rule to different models of the economy?
Simulations have shown that the simplest form of the Taylor rule is
surprisingly robust to a variety of different models of the economy,
more so than the more complex versions of the rule (see Taylor 1998).
Robustness to model/regime changes is a highly desirable property
under the circumstances we now face in Europe.  This was an
important reason why we chose to construct the monetary thermometer
using the simplest version of the rule.
•  Why not use forecast inflation instead of current and past values?
Setting aside the question of how to choose between competing
forecasts, we observe that in the end, all forecasts are still based on
current and past data.  Along with Taylor, we justify the explicit use of
already observed values for reasons of clarity/transparency.  Taking an
average of inflation over several periods is also useful because it
smoothes short-term fluctuations.
Exchange Rate Fluctuations
The Taylor rule still leaves out movements in exchange rates and in monetary
aggregates.  In view of the public attention that has surrounded the recent
exchange rate developments of the Euro, the impact of such fluctuations may be
worth examining more closely.  While it has been pointed out that the euro area
as a whole is not enormously dependent on external trade, individual member
countries are.  Table 3 below examines the importance to individual member
countries of trade with countries external to the euro area.  The first data column
shows the total exposure of each country (imports and exports to/from countries
outside of the euro area) as a proportion of GDP.  The second data column
shows the proportion of exports + imports which each country had with the non
euro area in 1998.
The impact of exchange rate fluctuations on the real economies of
individual member countries varies widely depending on the exposures of the
economies to trade outside the euro area.  A country for which trade constitutes
a small part of GDP, and which trades mostly with other countries within the
euro area, is unlikely to be affected by large swings in the dollar-euro exchange
rate.  Nonetheless, from Table 3, we can see that the fast-growing economies of
Finland and Ireland are highly exposed to currency movements, since both
engage in a great deal of trade with countries that are not in the euro area.  A
sustained depreciation of the euro may therefore dramatically increase domestic
competitiveness in these countries as well as import some inflation from abroad.RSC 2000/14 © 2000 N. Björksten and M. Syrjänen 20
Belgium/Luxembourg and the Netherlands also figure prominently, although
their vulnerability to exchange rate fluctuations may be overstated since the
proportion of transit trade is substantially greater.
If Ireland and Finland are already in danger of overheating, as suggested
by the monetary thermometer, then sustained weakness of the Euro would surely
be an unwelcome development.  This would serve to further increase the
pressures on labour markets and other adjustment  mechanisms to compensate
for a monetary policy that is too loose for local conditions.
Table 3. Non Euro Area (NEA) Trade 1998
NEA trade /
GDP         %
NEA trade /











   Data source: Eurostat, NewCronos
In conclusion, many differences exist within the euro area, which are in turn
reflected in different “benchmark optimal” monetary conditions.  Are these
differences large enough to be meaningful?  The barometer and thermometer
cannot answer this question.  For this, we need a better assessment of the
flexibility of available adjustment mechanisms.  This is the subject of Section 4.
4. Capacity for Fiscal Adjustment and Labour Market Flexibility
It can be argued that for the most part, the reasons underlying economic
divergences are beside the point.  The very fact that divergences have grown
underlines the importance of alternative economic adjustment channels besides
monetary policy.  To the extent that institutions of financial markets, labour
markets and fiscal policy are flexible enough to effectively compensate for less-
than-optimal monetary policy from the point of view of an individual country,
there is little problem.  In this respect, the problem of diverging business cycles
within a monetary union is very similar to the problem of asymmetric shocks.
In their detail, both fiscal and structural  reform are extraordinarily
difficult to map out.  There is considerable path dependency in policy design,
and policymakers are not starting from a clean slate.  What can effectively beRSC 2000/14 © 2000 N. Björksten and M. Syrjänen 21
achieved today depends a great deal on what has been done in the past.  For this
reason, we will not attempt to propose specific reform measures in this paper;
detailed and comprehensive studies have been made elsewhere and are now
under consideration by member country governments.
There are, however, several indicators of institutional rigidities in fiscal
policy and labour markets.  While our analysis is far from conclusive, it
provides at least some indication of the relative effectiveness of adjustment
channels in different euro area countries, and is thereby useful to identify and
focus attention on key areas of concern.
Fiscal Flexibility
In the case of fiscal policy, we have run a very simple simulation whereby we
computed the risk of different euro area countries exceeding the three per cent
stability and growth pact deficit limits in 1999.
The method we used involves three steps.  First, we assumed that budget
deficits are only a function of changes in GDP growth – nothing else.  In other
words, if GDP growth were to remain unchanged, the budget deficit would also
remain unchanged from year to year.  Second, we subtracted forecast GDP
growth in 1999 from growth in 1998 in order to determine what the expected
GDP change will be.  Finally, we multiplied this GDP change by EC-estimated
coefficients for deficit sensitivity to obtain a forecast impact on 1999 budget
deficits.  We repeated the exercise to obtain forecast budget deficits for the year
2000.
Table 4 tabulates the results.  The data indicate potential problems for
France, but none of the other countries exceed the critical 3 per cent SGP
constraint.
Aside from the risks facing France, the conclusions we draw from this
exercise are by and large optimistic.  Continuing the exercise into the year 2000,
none of the other countries ran up against the SGP deficit limit.  None of the
other countries reach the limit even if GDP growth were to drop by more than
one half percentage point from currently forecast levels.  Thus, for most of the
countries that the thermometer identifies as suffering from a locally
inappropriate monetary policy, the fiscal mechanisms are probably sufficiently
robust to avoid problems with the stability and growth pact 3 per cent deficit
limit for now.RSC 2000/14 © 2000 N. Björksten and M. Syrjänen 22













1998       1999
5
       2000
5
Portugal 4.0 3.2 3.3 0.5 -2.3 -2.7 -2.7
Italy 1.4 1.6 2.3 0.5 -2.7 -2.6 -2.3
France 3.2 2.3 2.7 0.5 -2.9 -3.4 -3.2
Germany 2.8 1.7 2.4 0.5 -2.1 -2.7 -2.3
Belgium 2.9 1.9 2.5 0.6 -1.3 -1.9 -1.5
Spain 3.8 3.3 3.5 0.6 -1.8 -2.1 -2.0
Netherlands 3.7 2.3 2.7 0.8 -0.9 -2.0 -1.7
Ireland 11.9 9.3 8.6 0.5 2.3 1.0 0.6
Austria 3.3 2.3 2.7 0.5 -2.1 -2.6 -2.4
Finland 5.3 3.7 3.9 0.6 1.0 0.0 0.2
 Data source: EC
 1 Gross domestic product, real percentage change on preceding year.
 2 EC estimates, 1995
 3 General government net lending (+) or borrowing (-) as percentage of GDP.
 4 1999 and 2000 forecasts of III-1999.
5 Authors' calculations.
This nonetheless abstracts from effects of structural issues such as ageing
populations, as well as any extraordinary measures that governments may have
at their disposal.  The analysis also abstracts from risks that may result from
overheating of economies.  In our view, such risks are considerable in some
countries, and there may be very little room for complacency even if budgetary
processes are in principle good.
A striking feature is that the budget elasticities to GDP (Table 4, column
4) are so similar across the euro area countries.  This suggests that, all else
equal, the countries at greatest risk of exceeding the SGP 3 per cent deficit
constraint are those which (i) are already close to this constraint and (ii) expect
growth to slow down.  There is very little difference across euro area countries
in terms of relative flexibility of fiscal policy.
Labour Market Flexibility
Academics, research institutes, interest groups, national authorities, international
organisations, etc have already studied labour markets in the  euro area very
extensively
17.  While there is a heated debate regarding the nature, sequence and
timetable of policy measures, an overwhelming consensus exists that labour
markets should become more flexible.
In assessing the capacity of individual countries to respond to economic
shocks and pressures, it is also useful to have a rough assessment of the relative
                                                             
17 Informative studies include Coe and Snower (1997), European Commission (1998), and
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flexibility of labour markets across the euro area
18.  One way to do this is to rank
countries in terms of different labour market rigidity indicators.  Table 5 does
this, using as indicators net replacement rates, tax wedges, employers’ social
security contributions and long-term unemployment.  An overall rank (in the last
column) is obtained by naively summing the ranks of countries for each of the
four indicators.  The ranking exercise suggests that labour markets in France and
Finland are the most inflexible; by comparison, Ireland, Luxembourg and
Portugal have the most flexible labour markets.


















FI 103 FI 50.3 IT 31.7 SP 9.4 France 1
LU 91 IT 48.3 FR 30.2 IT 8.3 Finland 2
FR 84 BE 48.2 BE 25.8 BE 5.4 Belgium 3
NL 82 FR 45.4 SP 23.5 FR 5.0 Italy 4
GE 80 NL 39.9 FI 20.5 GE 4.9 Spain 5
PT 77 AT 37.3 AT 19.6 IE 4.4 Germany 6
BE 72 GE 35.0 PT 19.2 FI 3.2 Netherlands 7
AT 69 SP 33.5 GE 16.8 PT 2.1 Austria 8
SP 67 PT 30.9 LU 11.7 NL 1.9 Portugal 9
IE 64 IE 29.9 IE 10.7 AT 1.3 Luxembourg 10
IT 11 LU 22.7 NL 7.6 LU 0.9 Ireland 11
      Sources:  Long-term unemployment is from the EC, the rest of the data is from the OECD.
Notes:
1 Per cent of the average earnings of a production worker, in the 12
th month of unemployment
benefit receipt, for a couple with two children, dependent spouse.  Data is from 1997.
2 Per cent of gross labour costs for average production workers.  Includes income taxes, employer and
employee social security contributions, but not indirect taxes and cash transfers.  Tax rates refer to one-
earner couples with two children, and take into account standard tax reliefs.  Data is from 1996.
3 Per cent of gross labour costs for average production workers. Data is from 1996.
4 Unemployment duration is greater than one year.  Data is from 1998.
5 Obtained by adding the ranks of each country in each of the four indicators.
There are at least three serious limitations to this type of exercise.  First, the
overall inflexibility ranking places an equal weight on each of the four
indicators, without considering interactions or co-movements between
indicators.  Second, the choice of indicators is debatable
19.  Third, the rankings
do not consider how small or large the difference is between countries, even
                                                             
18 This does not take away from the fact that all EU countries may be experiencing a gradual
increase in labour market flexibility as cross-border labour mobility increases, at least for
skilled workers.  Current labour market adjustment via cross-border (and even internal)
migration is very low, however, and is expected to increase only very slowly.  For a
discussion of this, see Eichengreen (1998c) and OECD (1999b).
19 For example, employers’ social security contributions (column 3) is already included as a
component in the total tax wedge (column 2).RSC 2000/14 © 2000 N. Björksten and M. Syrjänen 24
though large differences should matter much more than small ones.  In
summary, a different ranking might result from adding more indicators,
considering slightly different indicators or weighting the current indicators in a
different way.  Nonetheless, the sole purpose of the exercise is to provide one
indication of relative labour market inflexibility across the euro area, and Table
5 should be viewed with this in mind.
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Panel B
Data source: OECD Economic Outlook 65.
Figure 7 shows the different developments that have taken place in two groups
of euro area countries.  Figure 7 panel A shows countries that have seen a slow
but steady increase in unemployment rates.  These include the three largest
countries (Germany, France and Italy), which together make up close to 70 per
cent of the euro area weighted average.  Except for Belgium, there has been very
little volatility in the series.  Panel B shows rapidly growing countries that have
consequently in recent  years experienced substantial declines in their
unemployment rates.  With the exceptions of Spain and Finland, unemployment
rates are now below 7-8 per cent.RSC 2000/14 © 2000 N. Björksten and M. Syrjänen 25
This 7-8 per cent level is important for reasons relating to the effective
functioning of labour market institutions.  In all countries, receiving
unemployment benefits is contingent on the applicant actively looking for work.
This job search requirement is in practice much easier to enforce when
unemployment is low; usually there is not a great shortage of jobs and labour
offices have better opportunities to monitor the individual cases of job-seekers
who fail to successfully find jobs.  When the unemployment rate rises much
above 7-8 per cent, the job search requirement becomes much harder to enforce,
leading to greater incidence of abuse of the system and labour market offices
that are much less effective in implementing policy.
In summary, there is not a great deal of evidence to suggest that the euro
area economies by and large have efficient mechanisms at their disposal which
will allow them to adapt to diverging economic developments and occasional
asymmetric shocks of moderate size.  Fortunately, the 3 per cent fiscal deficit
limit imposed by the stability pact is still probably not unduly tight, so there
exists a window of opportunity to take effective reform measures.  While labour
markets are showing increasing signs of flexibility in half of the  euro area
countries, these are primarily the smaller ones representing only a small fraction
of the  euro area weighted average.  In terms of relative capacities of labour
markets to adapt, there remains a wide divergence.
The absence of an imminent crisis is not a good reason for complacency;
serious  longer term structural issues, such as ageing populations, will still
require response measures.  Moreover, there remains the potential for large
external shocks from America, Japan or emerging markets, as well as the
formidable challenge of smoothly integrating the accession countries to the EU.
In any event, more flexibly functioning markets lead to faster and less disruptive
adaptation to changes in the economic environment, of which there will
probably be many more as Europe continues to integrate more closely.
5. Concluding Remarks
The divergences between euro area economies have the potential to become a
serious issue, and should therefore be carefully monitored.  While a common
monetary policy cannot by itself respond to divergences in individual countries,
the “outlier” countries are still important for two reasons.  First, their existence
complicates policymaking, thereby calling for additional, more disaggregated
statistics to supplement the area-wide weighted averages.  Second, and in a
worst case scenario, unless due attention is paid to the extremes, one or more
countries may eventually suffer a political crisis over the costs of remaining in
the common currency area.RSC 2000/14 © 2000 N. Björksten and M. Syrjänen 26
In the medium term therefore, until fiscal and structural (labour and
product market) adjustment mechanisms have become more flexible, and until
financial integration has had time to deepen further, it may be desirable to pay
close attention to divergences of internal economic developments.  While the
European Central Bank is under normal circumstances concerned only with
euro-area aggregate developments in setting monetary policy, it also has a stake
in preventing  crises which might compromise the integrity of the system.
Therefore, it cannot remain completely outside of the debate on limiting
downside risks for individual euro-area countries that find themselves subjected
either to asymmetric shocks or a sufficiently severe cyclical swing that is out of
synchronisation with the rest of the euro area.
In the event of a crisis, fiscal policy can theoretically be made more
expansive.  One way would be for the EU could be given greater leeway to tax
member country citizens and transfer funds to depressed areas.  This implies a
greater political integration than most countries at present would be prepared to
accept, and is therefore unlikely to happen for many years ( Haaparanta and
Peisa 1997, Eichengreen 1998a).  Alternatively, an exception can be made to the
SGP, but this would have the equally unacceptable consequence of
compromising the integrity and credibility of the pact in the fist place.  At
present, the safeguard clauses of the pact are generally seen as sufficiently
flexible to accommodate all but the most improbable circumstances, thus giving
member countries additional leeway when necessary to cope with domestic
economic problems.
The risks to the system deriving from excessive divergences are perhaps
the greatest in the first five years, after which institutional structures will have
had more time to adapt and automatic stabilisers, including with regard to labour
markets, will become more effective.  Nonetheless, the challenges of ageing
populations and the slow speed at which budgetary reforms have historically
taken place makes clear that the margin for complacency is limited even in the
medium term.
One reasonable step that could be taken to strengthen the system would be
to further improve surveillance.  In particular, indicators should be put into place
to monitor divergences in economic developments within the euro zone, so that
appropriate steps can be taken in time to contain adverse developments and
possibly deter a crisis.  The nature of these “appropriate steps” will require
further discussion both at political and economic levels, and are outside of the
scope of this paper.
With regard to improved surveillance tools, we have two proposals.  First,
with regard to country comparisons, a “convergence barometer” is developedRSC 2000/14 © 2000 N. Björksten and M. Syrjänen 27
which simultaneously illustrates divergences in six more or less interdependent
dimensions.  Second, in order to assess strains on real sector adjustment
mechanisms, we propose a Taylor rule based “monetary thermometer”.  This
would provide a benchmark for how much actual monetary policy deviates from
what would be the optimal if the entire Euro area economy were to look exactly
like that of an individual member state.
While little time has passed so far since the introduction of the euro, the
effectiveness of policy measures in the euro area will become easier to assess as
more data becomes available.  In the meantime, much work remains to be done
in assessing and enhancing the capacity of real economic adjustment channels to
respond not only to asymmetric shocks but also to trend and cyclical
divergences within the common currency area.
Directions for Further Research
There are at least two logical extensions to this paper.  First, a more thorough
assessment is needed of the current capacity of economies to adjust by
themselves to economic imbalances, including a common monetary policy that
may be too loose or too tight for local conditions.  Related to this work is the
development of alternative mechanisms for  euro area wide intervention to
support stabilisation in member  countries which are unable to return to a
sustainable growth path on their own accord.
The second and more straightforward extension is to apply the framework
above to the EU enlargement debate, where the challenge for the ECB is to
ensure the smooth transition of applicant countries into the EMU.  Versions of
the convergence barometer and monetary thermometer could be developed
which would facilitate surveillance of countries which are currently on an
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Data Note:  The dates of the latest observations are as indicated below.
EU11 BE DE ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI
Inflation 8/99 8/99 8/99 8/99 8/99 8/99 8/99 8/99 8/99 8/99 8/99 8/99
Unemployment 8/99 8/99 8/99 8/99 8/99 5/99 4/99 8/99 5/99 8/99 8/99 8/99
Credit growth 5/99 5/99 5/99 5/99 5/99 5/99 5/99 5/99 5/99 5/99 5/99 5/99
GDP growth q2-99 q1-99 q2-99 q1-99 q2-99 98 q2-99 98 q2-99 q1-99 q4-98 q2-99
Fiscal balance 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
Debt/GDP 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99RSC 2000/14 © 2000 N. Björksten and M. Syrjänen 34
Annex 2.          Testing Monetary Thermometer Robustness
To assess the robustness of the monetary thermometer, we conducted a series of
sensitivity tests in July 1999 using a different data source, changing the target
level of inflation and the coefficient attributed to inflation changes.  The results
are reported in Figure A2.1, panels A-D.  Note that the baseline data in Panel A
reflects the situation in the summer of 1999, rather than the updated data in
Figure 5 of the text.
Figure A2.1.  Monetary Thermometer Sensitivity Test Results.
Panel A: Baseline Panel B: IMF output gaps











1.0 Germany France 1.0
Italy 2.7
2.0 Austria







Panel C: Inflation target 1.5% Panel D: Inflation coefficient 2
1.4 Germany France 1.6









1.4 Germany France 1.5
Italy 2.7
1.8 Austria






0,9RSC 2000/14 © 2000 N. Björksten and M. Syrjänen 35
Panel A is the baseline thermometer as reported in the text, but with data
available in July 1999.  The source of the output gap estimates is the OECD, the
assumed target level for inflation is 1.0 per cent, the coefficient of response to
inflation changes is 1.5 and the target level of inflation is 1.0 per cent annually.
Panel B shows the thermometer with all the same baseline assumptions,
but using the IMF estimates for the output gap.  Compared with the OECD, the
IMF is more pessimistic about output gaps, implying that on average the euro
area countries are further below their level of potential output, with this holding
particularly true for the large countries France and Germany.  As a consequence,
using the IMF figures in the Taylor rule gives us a lower benchmark optimal
level of interest rates for the euro area as a whole: 2.1 per cent as opposed to
2.5
20.  The range of benchmark optimal interest rates is greater, indicating that
using IMF figures, the euro area divergences are even more worrying.
Panel C shows the baseline thermometer where the target level of
inflation is a higher 1.5 per cent, instead of 1 per cent.  This shifts the entire
scale of the thermometer down by 0.25 percentage points, but there is no change
at all in the range or the relative ranking of the countries.
Panel D shows the baseline thermometer where the inflation coefficient
has been raised by 0.5 percentage points to 2.  This form of the Taylor rule
therefore responds slightly more strongly to changes in inflation.  This obviously
accentuates further the differences between the countries in terms of which
interest level is benchmark optimal under different locally prevailing inflation
circumstances.
The conclusion of the sensitivity tests is that the monetary thermometer is
impressively robust.  In each of the tests, the order of the countries is virtually
identical, with no change at all at either the top or the bottom.  We are therefore
quite confident in saying that, given prevailing country differences, Ireland,
Portugal, the Netherlands and Spain would benefit from tighter monetary
conditions while France and Germany would benefit from the reverse.
                                                             
20 Unlike the OECD, the IMF does not calculate an output gap figure for the euro area as a
whole.  The figure we used was derived by weighting the individual country output gaps
using the same weights that eurostat uses in calculating euro area aggregate inflation.